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KEITH BREEN
WORK AND EMANCIPATORY PRACTICE:
TOWARDS A RECOVERY OF HUMAN BEINGS’
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITIES
ABSTRACT. This article argues that productive work represents a mode of human
ﬂourishing unfortunately neglected in much current political theorizing. Focusing on
Habermasian critical theory, I contend that Habermas’s dualist theory of society,
with its underpinning distinction between communicative and instrumental reason,
excludes work and the economy from ethical reﬂection. To avoid this uncritical turn,
we need a concept of work that retains a core emancipatory referent. This, I claim, is
provided by Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of practice’. The notion of practice’
is signiﬁcant in suggesting an alternative conception of human productivity that is
neither purely instrumental nor purely communicative, but rather both simulta-
neously: a form of activity which issues in material products and yet presumes a
community of workers engaged in intersubjective self-transformation. However, we
can endorse MacIntyre’s notion of practice’ only if we reject his totalizing anti-
modernism and insist on the emancipatory potentialities of modern institutions.
KEY WORDS: alienated labour, ethics, Habermas, MacIntyre, practices,
self-transformation, work
INTRODUCTION1
In this study the question of work as both a condition and mode
of human self-realization is explored. The argument begins with
Ju¨rgen Habermas’s dualist theory of society, speciﬁcally his life-
world/system’ contrast and the colonization’ thesis which issues
from it. Although motivated by a desire to critically lay bare perva-
sive lifeworld pathologies, Habermas’s colonization’ thesis, as a
result of the communicative versus instrumental reason binary which
1 I would like to thank Russell Keat, Andrew Schaap, Nicholas Smith and the
reviewers for their very helpful comments and suggestions.
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provides its foundation, has the decidedly uncritical eﬀect of eﬀac-
ing the ethical-political signiﬁcance of work and production for
people’s everyday lives. By contrast, Alasdair MacIntyre’s non-
dualist theory of practice’ provides a means by which to recover
and reﬂect upon this essential lifeworld’ component. Especially
important here is MacIntyre’s critique of managerial conceptions of
production, but more speciﬁcally his suggestion of an alternative
mode of human productivity that is neither purely instrumental nor
primarily communicative, but rather both simultaneously, a form of
human activity which eﬀects changes in and produces the human
artiﬁce, and yet presumes a reﬂective community of actors bound
together by constitutive excellences. Re-conceived in this manner,
work assumes the potentially emancipatory aspect neglected or
directly denied by much current social and political theory. How-
ever, MacIntyre’s contribution to the attempt to rethink the contem-
porary signiﬁcance of productive activity is compromised by a
thorough-going anti-modernism which threatens to render his theory
of practice anachronistic. Hence the need for an understanding of
work located squarely within the critical possibilities of the present.
CRITICAL THEORY, HABERMAS, AND THE DEVALUATION
OF PRODUCTIVE WORK
Marx’s account of the four-fold alienation of man under capital-
ism’s regime of abstract labour—of man from his product, from his
activity of producing, from his species-being’ or essential nature,
and from other men—ﬁnds clearest practical manifestation in the
late 19th–early 20th century discipline of scientiﬁc workplace man-
agement’, as articulated in Frederick Taylor’s 1911 classic, The
Principles of Scientiﬁc Management.2 There are three core features
2 Frederick Taylor, The Principles of Scientiﬁc Management (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1967 [1911]). For Marx on alienated labour’, see Karl Marx, Alienated
Labour’, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 2nd edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000) 85–95. On Taylor’s signiﬁcance, see Harry Braverman,
Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), pp. 59–84; Axel Honneth, Work and Instru-
mental Action: On the Normative Basis of Critical Theory’, in his The Fragmented
World of the Social: Essays in Social and Political Philosophy, ed. Charles W. Wright
(New York: SUNY Press, 1995), 15–49, pp. 26–27; and James Bernard Murphy, The
Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory (New Haven &
London: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 8, 21–27.
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to Taylor’s vision of scientiﬁcally managed work: the detachment
of work from the skills and knowledge of workers and, therefore,
the increasing superﬂuity of worker expertise; the separation of
conception from execution, that is, of planning work from the pro-
cess of carrying out work, of managers from workers; and, ﬁnally,
precise managerial control over every aspect of the working pro-
cess. It was against early materializations of such detailed and frag-
mented divisions of labour that the early Marx, drawing on a
model of autonomous craftsmanship, juxtaposed his ideal of con-
crete or truly human labour: work that is simultaneously the pos-
session and expression of the individual worker in all her diversity
and in genuine community with others. Indeed, Marx saw social
labour as the mode of human emancipation, since he conceived
social labour as the context within which human beings come to
consciousness of reality and of their true capabilities, as well as the
contingent oppressive constraints imposed upon these capabilities
by particular social orders.3 Despite the increasing regimentation
and dehumanization of working life, Marx insisted that it was only
through social labour that such dehumanization could be contested
and eventually overcome.
It is against the background of Marx’s prioritization of social
labour that Habermas’s version of critical theory has to be under-
stood. Habermas’s key objection to Marx is that he stands guilty of
a categorical monism that reduces all forms of human action to
work. As Habermas sees it, the danger of this monism is twofold: a
reduction of all aspects of social reality and human experience to
the economic, and, more problematically still, to the technologies
or forces of production that in large part constitute the economic.
Though not Marx’s intention, his elevation of labour could very
quickly be interpreted in a mechanistic manner’ where the move-
ments of history were identiﬁable with material causal laws.4 That
interpretation provides legitimation for technological determinism
and technocracy, since if the course of human history is identiﬁable
with material causal laws, then only those with access to or knowl-
edge of these laws ought to rule. In turn, the effect of this scienti-
zation of politics is the reduction of political endeavour to an
instrumental means, to administration, and thereby a denial of its
3 As made clear by Honneth, Work and Instrumental Action’, p. 16.
4 Ju¨rgen Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 168.
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genuinely moral-ethical content – the need for citizens to deliberate
over and critically evaluate their ends.5
To counter the elision of ethics, Habermas distinguishes labour
(poiesis) from human interaction (praxis) – the key distinction, he
claims, blurred by Marx.6 This distinction forms the bedrock of
Habermas’s dualist reconstruction of historical materialism and, as
well, his attempt to recover the normative potential of modernity
from the pessimistic analyses of modern rationalization offered by
Max Weber. In short, labour corresponds to the material reproduc-
tion of the species – human beings’ attempt to control and dominate
nature – whereas interaction corresponds to our species’ social
reproduction, the linguistic co-generation of symbolic order. Funda-
mental here is a distinction between communicative and instrumental
action/reason. When actors reason instrumentally, in line with
Weberian Zweckrationalita¨t, they reason according to technical cri-
teria and empirical facts as to the best means to their desired ends,
where objects and people are viewed as resources to those ends.
Efﬁciency and success are therefore the criteria governing instru-
mental action. In contrast, communicative action is governed by
the internal goal of mutual understanding, where subjects reason
5 Technocratic consciousness reﬂects not the sundering of an ethical situation but
the repression of ethics’ as such as a category of life’, Habermas, Toward a Rational
Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics (London: Heinemann, 1971), p. 112. I
ignore Habermas’s later division of ethics’ and morality’.
6 Marx does not actually explicate the interrelationship of interaction and labour,
but instead, under the unspeciﬁc title of social praxis, reduces the one to the other,
namely communicative action to instrumental action … the productive activity
which regulates the material exchange of the human species with its natural envi-
ronment, becomes the paradigm for the generation of all the categories’, Habermas,
Theory and Practice, p. 168. See also Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
(London: Heinemann, 1971), p. 57; Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of
Society (London: Heinemann, 1979), pp. 95–129; Habermas, The Theory of Com-
municative Action, Volume II: System and Lifeworld – A Critique of Functionalist
Reason (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 343, hereafter TCA, II; Habermas, The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 63, here-
after PDM; Habermas, What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Revolutions of
Recuperation and the Need for New Thinking’, in Robin Blackburn (ed.), After the
Fall: The Failure of Communism and the Future of Socialism (London, New York:
Verso, 1991) 25–46, p. 34; and Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Ju¨rgen
Habermas (London: Hutchinson, 1978), pp. 30–34. It is worth noting that from the
late 1970s onwards Habermas uses the terms instrumental’ and communicative
reason’ instead of labour’ and interaction’. However, the referents of the terms are
largely unchanged.
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dialogically on the basis of publicly assessable validity claims (truth,
rightness, truthfulness) in the hope of arriving at an uncoerced
rationally motivated assent’.7 On the basis of this separation of
action types, Habermas then differentiates two irreducible modes of
rationalization, lifeworld and systemic rationalization. By lifeworld’
Habermas intends the intersubjective horizon of pre-given space and
pre-theoretical knowledge and assumptions in which people exist,
act, and interact. Lifeworld rationalization means, in short, that the
reﬂective symbolic achievements of cultural knowledge transmission,
of social integration, and of identity formation, the paths along
which a distinctly human life is formed, increasingly issue more
from rationally motivated agreement’ than from customary beliefs
and pre-reﬂective mores.8 Systemic rationalization, differently, refers
to the increasing material productivity and formal organization of
human social orders. Its criterion is not communication but the inten-
sifying complexity of an increasingly depersonalized instrumental
rationality accessible only to the counterintuitive knowledge of the
social sciences developing since the eighteenth century’.9
The point of this two-level’ theory of society is to show, contra
the ideology of technicism, that technical progress and social eman-
cipation are distinct – that they are achieved according to two dis-
tinct logics or modes of rationalization.10 Although Habermas does
not dismiss technological consciousness or the positivist natural
science perspective on which it rests, he does want to limit it to its
proper domain. Thus, while technological consciousness is appro-
priate as regards material production and formal organization, he
insists that only the communicative use of propositionally differen-
tiated language … is proper to our socio-cultural forms of life’.11
7 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I: Reason and the
Rationalization of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), p. 287, hereafter TCA, I;
Habermas, A Reply’, in Axel Honneth and Hans Joas (eds), Communicative Action:
Essays on Ju¨rgen Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1991) 214–264, p. 237.
8 TCA, I, p. 70. See also TCA, I, pp. 337, 340; TCA, II, p. 146; and PDM, p. 321.
9 TCA, II, pp. 173, 180.
10 This has been the central theme of Habermas’s writings from the very beginning
and one which still dominates his work. Consider, for instance, his recent critique of
human cloning as a development which threatens to once again blur the distinction
between technical advancement and social emancipation – see Habermas. The Future
of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity, 2003).
11 PDM, p.312.
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Moreover, in the idea of interaction or communicative reason’,
Habermas believes he has found not only a means of limiting
technicism, but also a counterfactual ideal or standard by which to
compare and critique all forms of illegitimate power. For basic to
the linguistic mechanism of the reproduction of the species’ is the
utopian perspective of reconciliation and freedom … ingrained in
the conditions for communicative sociation of individuals’.12
Given this practical emphasis, it is clear that Habermas does not
conceive of the lifeworld-system distinction in analytic terms alone.
Rather, central to his account of the development of modern social
forms is a desire to illuminate how realms of norm-free sociality’ his-
torically broke free or uncoupled’ from the lifeworld contexts of fam-
ily and civil society (the bourgeois public sphere).13 Thus the social’ is
split up into spheres of action constituted as the lifeworld and spheres neutralized
against the lifeworld. The former are communicatively structured, the latter for-
mally organized … [standing] opposite one another as socially and systemically
integrated spheres of action.14
Governed by a latent functionality’ (instrumental reason writ
large’) that works behind the backs of actors, the sub-systems of
the economy and bureaucratic state are regulated only via power
and money’. Indeed, norm-conformative attitudes and identity-
forming social memberships are neither necessary nor possible in
these spheres; they are made peripheral instead’.15 However, it
would be wrong, Habermas claims, simply to condemn this uncou-
pling. Systemic rationalization represents an evolutionary advance
in productivity and organizational potential, the market and mod-
ern bureaucratic forms being the only efﬁcient means by which to
determine equivalences between disparate goods and to co-ordinate
policy initiatives.16 Far from alleviating the maladies of the present,
a de-differentiating rejection of systemic complexity would mean
12 TCA, I, p. 398. See also TCA, I, pp. 94–101, 337–341, 391–399; TCA, II,
pp. 153–197; and Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, Social Action and Human Nature
(Cambridge: CUP, 1988), p. 156.
13 TCA, II, pp. 154, 171; PDM, p. 349. That the distinction is to be understood in
an essentialist’ and historical sense, see Habermas, A Reply’, p. 256.
14 TCA, II, p. 309.
15 Ibid., p. 154.
16 Habermas (TCA, II, pp. 339–340; What Does Socialism Mean Today?’, pp. 34,
38–41) accuses Marx of ignoring the positive evolutionary aspect of systemic
diﬀerentiation and rationalization.
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both a repressive embrace of metaphysical totalities and social
chaos. Against idealizations of the past, Habermas argues that sys-
temic imperatives only become destructive when they reach in and
transform the irreplaceable reproductive mechanisms of the life-
world. This occurs when systemic crises (disequilibria’), such as
class conﬂict or recession, are successfully intercepted by having
recourse to lifeworld resources’, that is, by re-deﬁning lifeworld
structures so as to reduce the likelihood of material or organiza-
tional instability.17 Such colonization’ or mediatization’ has drastic
eﬀects because cultural and intersubjective meaning can neither be
bought nor coerced’.18 When symbolic needs and lifeworld roles
are translated into systemic imperatives, communal and individual
life suffer abstraction’ and cease to be the result of communication
or intersubjective will. Increasing their areas of competency and
control, the market and state therefore loom over the lifeworld as a
quasi-natural force’ or second nature’ beyond the power of sub-
jects to understand or to change.19
The goal of critical theory, then, is to locate and counter the col-
onization of lifeworld by system. The later Habermas sees new
social movements’ and the interplay of weak’ and strong’ publics
as the best means for contesting the commodiﬁcation and bureau-
cratization of everyday life.20 However, he places two key limits on
this politics of resistance. First, and pivotally, the old utopian vision
inhering in the ideal of a labouring society’ no longer has force.
This Marxist and pre-Marxist vision no longer applies insofar as
labour, as self-creative activity, has irretrievably succumbed to sys-
tem, the one attempt at reversing this trend having concluded in the
disaster of state socialism.21 Communication, instead, replaces
labour as the utopian rallying cry to protect the universal structures
17 TCA, II, pp. 385–386.
18 Habermas, A Reply’, p.259; Habermas, Concluding Remarks’, in Craig
Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992),
462–479, p. 473.
19 TCA, II, pp. 155, 311, 375; PDM, p. 353.
20 While there are signiﬁcant changes of emphasis between The Theory of Com-
municative Action (1984; 1987) and Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity,
1996), the basic architectonic of Habermas’s social theory remains the same.
21 Weber’s prognosis has proven correct: the abolition of private capitalism would
not at all mean the destruction of the iron cage of modern industrial labour’ (TCA, II,
p. 340). See also Habermas, What Does Socialism Mean Today?’, p. 38, and Hab-
ermas, The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 123–125.
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of human intersubjectivity. Second, an emancipatory politics must
be both critical and self-limiting. Consequent upon uncoupling’, a
politics trying to render systemic imperatives less destructive of life-
world infrastructures must nevertheless respect the logics of the
economy and state administration. Rather than conquering’ system,
the goal is to indirectly curb or guide it toward an equilibrium
between the integrative forces of intersubjective communication,
money, and administrative power. Undemocratizable from within’,
the economy and administrative state can be held in check solely by
a radical reformist’ approach aimed at erecting a democratic dam
against ... colonizing encroachment’.22
There are undoubted strengths to Habermas’s position. Empha-
sizing the signiﬁcance of communicatively generated solidarity, he
arrives at a heuristically fruitful counter-factual by which to illumi-
nate and criticize illegitimate forms of power that arise from unin-
terrogated prejudices, deception, or unprincipled coercion. His
rejection of economic reductivism and stress on the difference
between technical progress and social emancipation also fundamen-
tally ring true. Human freedom does not equate with an abundance
of consumer goods or with ever more efﬁcient administration. Fur-
thermore, the critique of colonization’ echoes those broader move-
ments within socialist, environmental, and feminist thought which
condemn the injustices and cruelties occasioned by burgeoning
markets and untrammelled state bureaucracies.
Yet there are also good reasons for rejecting Habermas’s dualist
theory of society. The ﬁrst concerns his uncoupling’ thesis and the
claim that system’ represents a block of norm-free sociality’. In
short, what Habermas ignores in interpreting modern economic insti-
tutions in systemic-functional terms is the dependence of these insti-
tutions on speciﬁc moral-ethical attitudes, the fact that they are never
norm-free. For instance, Durkheim famously made clear that the
market mechanisms of contract and exchange are impossible without
trust, without the assumption that agreements will be honoured.23
22 Habermas, What Does Socialism Mean Today?’, p. 42; Habermas, Further
Reﬂections on the Public Sphere’, in Calhoun (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere,
421–461, p. 444; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 372.
23 See E´mile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson
(New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 215ﬀ. While Habermas (TCA, II, pp. 78–82) is
indeed aware of this feature of Durkheim’s thought, he fails to see its signiﬁcance for
his assertion of norm-free sociality’.
KEITH BREEN
Such trust is not secured by coercive legal enforcement alone, but
also by a scheme of social conventions and mores that renders
capitalist exchange both desirable and normal, transforming it
into the natural’ order of things. Thus, without an enterprise cul-
ture’, a culture which celebrates exchange and proﬁt as goods, the
market as a system of determining equivalences between disparate
goods would most likely cease to exist or at least be subject to
signiﬁcant disruption. Moreover, modern capitalism was not just
born of latent functional imperatives, but also underpinned and
motivated by venerable ethical arguments, the most signiﬁcant
being the view that market societies, in contrast to the customary
hierarchies of earlier societies, ensure individual freedom and
prosperity. As Booth puts it, the mode of producing and distrib-
uting the means of human sustenance embodied in the market is
expressive not [only] of a human propensity to truck, trade, and
barter … but [also] of a moral redrawing of the community and
of the place of the economy within it’.24 Obscuring these classical
liberal arguments, Habermas also veils important moral-ethical
counterarguments to market capitalism, one of the most signiﬁ-
cant being that under capitalism the productive capacities of
human beings suffer avertable distortion.
The idea of an uncoupling’ of lifeworld and system, of a sup-
posed division between normatively imbued realms of human inter-
course and realms purged of moral-ethical values, is therefore
deceptive – more an instance of grand myth-making than a reliable
historical account.25 However, the difﬁculty with the lifeworld-sys-
tem dualism is not just one of poor history. Rather, the core prob-
lem is that this essentialist distinction bifurcates communicative
from instrumental action, symbolic from material reproduction, in
assigning each to ontologically spatialized and opposed realms,
with the result that in certain arenas of human life important
24 William James Booth, On the Idea of the Moral Economy’, American Political
Science Review 88/3 (1994) 653–667, p. 661, my emphasis.
25 I owe this point to Professor Russell Keat (personal conversation), but see also
Barry Barnes, The Elements of Social Theory (London: UCL Press, 1995), pp. 211–
215.
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possibilities for intervention and change are ruled out by unsub-
stantiated theoretical ﬁat.26
This is most obvious as regards the concept and reality of work.
As Habermas understands it, work equates with the domination
and control of external nature. This control is at best a pre-condi-
tion of human emancipation, not a rudimentary element or expres-
sion of such emancipation. In contrast to the intersubjectivity
inherent in communicative reason, work is a purely instrumental
category whose meaning exists outside itself, that is, in the prod-
ucts and commodities produced. The result of this line of thought
is that work as a mode of human experience and endeavour is
peremptorily purged of any internal moral-ethical signiﬁcance. The
only evaluative criterion is that of efﬁciency, not the character of
the human relationships that pertain in production. This has the
effect of not only concealing the role that employment and job
status have on individuals’ self-esteem, but also the ways in which
different forms of work enable or inhibit human freedom and hap-
piness.27 Worse still, in deferring to systemic complexity Habermasian
critical theory validates the present, rather than calling it into ques-
tion. The best achievable is a fairer distribution of resources and
indirect regulation of the economy in terms of basic human rights.
Any attempt to alter the internal structures of existing working
practices is condemned as unrealistic’ romanticism, as a failure to
26 For similar criticisms of the lifeworld-system dualism, see James Bohman,
Habermas, Marxism, and Social Theory: The Case for Pluralism in Critical Social
Science’, in Peter Dews (ed.), Habermas: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1999) 53–86, pp. 61–62, 75–76; Anthony Giddens, Labour and Interaction’, in John
B. Thompson and David Held (eds), Habermas: Critical Debates (London:
Macmillan, 1982), 149–161; Hans Joas, The Unhappy Marriage of Hermeneutics
and Functionalism’, in Honneth and Joas (eds), Communicative Action, 97–118, pp.
116–117; Thomas McCarthy, Complexity and Democracy: or the Seducements of
Systems Theory’, in Honneth and Joas (eds), Communicative Action, 119–139, pp.
127–130; Jeﬀ Noonan, Modernization, Rights, and Democratic Society: The Limits
of Habermas’s Democratic Theory’, Res Publica 11/2 (2005) 101–123, pp. 110–120;
and William Scheuerman, Between Radicalism and Resignation: Democratic The-
ory in Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms’, in Dews (ed.), Habermas: A Critical
Reader, 153–177, pp. 168–172.
27 Honneth, Work and Instrumental Action’, p. 44; Honneth, The Social
Dynamics of Disrespect’, p. 334.
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come to terms with the hard-to-resist imperatives’ and functional
demands’ of a globalized system of market relations’.28 The injus-
tices, hardships, and drudgery suffered by men and women in their
working lives are therefore no longer attributable to human agency
and deliberate design, but issue instead from a reiﬁed and immuta-
ble logic.
Rejecting Marx’s identiﬁcation of emancipation with social
labour, Habermas goes to the opposite extreme of denying work
any emancipatory import whatsoever. In mirror image to Marx,
therefore, he himself stands guilty of reductivism, of reducing
moral-ethical experience to one form of human activity. Communi-
cative reason is both the sole source and mode of human maturity
and freedom. Gone is any sense that work might embody unique
aspects of human value and aspiration, might represent possibilities
for self-realization and autonomy unavailable in other activities.
Given this, it is clearly the case that Habermas offers a peculiarly
uncritical brand of critical theory. Admittedly, Habermas believes
his colonization’ thesis an apposite diagnosis of capitalism’s ill-
eﬀects. The problem with this thesis, however, is that it suggests
these ill-eﬀects are due to something extrinsic, the structures of
material reproduction, invading something intrinsic or uniquely
human, symbolic reproduction. Attributing an extrinsic status to
the material, colonization’ is therefore already a capitulation which
in its very conception forfeits labour and human beings’ productive
capacities to the latent functionalism of system. With it the social
and psychological signiﬁcance of one’s work and occupation, their
role in forming lifeworld identities, is suppressed and distanced
from reﬂection. Instead, work and the realm of production are
deemed inherently technical issues. The paradoxical consequence of
this, unfortunately, is to reinforce Taylor’s managerialist concep-
tion of work and to support, rather than contest, existing capital-
ism as an economic order. Habermas, a thinker whose ambition
has been to overcome false objectivisms and their political corre-
late, technocracy, actually ends up consigning large swathes of
social reality to those very same falsehoods.
28 TCA, II, p. 396; Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, p. 124. See also
PDM, pp. 350–352; Habermas, A Reply’, pp. 259, 261; and Habermas, What Does
Socialism Mean Today?’, p. 40. On the need for redistribution and indirect regula-
tion, see Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, pp. 122–123, 175, 409–446, and
Habermas, The Postnational Constellation, pp. 49–57, 80–112.
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MACINTYRE’S RECOVERY OF WORK
To avoid Habermas’s uncritical turn, we need a concept of work
which retains a core ethical and therefore emancipatory referent,
one which, as Honneth proposes, grasps categorically’ the differ-
ence between work understood as an act in which the working
subject structures and regulates his own activity’ and an impover-
ished conception in which neither the accompanying controls nor
the object-related structuring of the activity is left to the initiative
of the working-subject’.29 Here I want to suggest that Alasdair
MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian idea of practice’ provides such a
concept. My underlying claim is not that MacIntyre offers a det-
ailed description of what any speciﬁc form of productive work
ought to look like, but rather that he provides a defensible general
conception of meaningful work to counter currently dominant
technicist conceptions. To lend credibility to this claim, I make two
interrelated arguments: ﬁrst, that MacIntyre, in providing an inter-
subjective conception of practice, shows productive work to be
simultaneously community dependent and a mode of individual
self-transformation, therefore inescapably of intrinsic moral-ethical
import; second, that his thoughts on practices and their relation to
what he calls institutions’ yield a non-dualist conception of social
reality, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of Habermas’s lifeworld-system
dichotomy in bridging the instrumental versus communicative
action divide. These insights, combined with other elements of
MacIntyre’s thought, together provide a defensible alternative to
managerially determined divisions of labour.
The Concept of Practice’
What, then, is a practice’? Practices, for MacIntyre, include a vari-
ety of arts, sciences, games and … such productive activities as
29 Honneth, Work and Instrumental Action’, p. 46. Honneth later retreats from
this call for a critical concept of work, conceding the Habermasian view that one can
with good reasons’ argue that the criteria of moral assessment cannot be related to
the internal character of the work process itself’ (Author’s Introduction’ (1995), in
Honneth, The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in Social and Political Phi-
losophy, p. xviii).
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those of farming and ﬁshing’.30 They also include philosophizing,
child-rearing, and politics, at least in its classical Aristotelian, as
opposed to liberal, form. The characteristics which any practice
exhibits when in good order are revealed in MacIntyre’s deﬁnition
of the term. A practice is:
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and par-
tially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended.31
The key notions here are cooperative activity’, goods internal’,
and standards of excellence’. First, all practices are communal
endeavours, presuming not only the participation of a current gen-
eration of individuals but also a tradition’ or history which guides
and informs that generation’s activity.32 Thus, carpentry, no less
than physics, is informed by principles, ideals, and bodies of
knowledge inherited from the past. Second, and decisively, there is
a crucial distinction to be made between internal’ and external’
goods.33 External goods are the generic goods of money, power,
status, and prestige, whereas internal goods are speciﬁc to an indi-
vidual practice, that is, can only be known and achieved through
30 Alasdair MacIntyre, Rights, Practices and Marxism: Reply to Six Critics’,
Analyse & Kritik 7 (1985) 234–248, p. 242, hereafter RPM. See also MacIntyre, After
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1985), p. 188,
hereafter AV; MacIntyre, An Interview for Cogito’ (1991), in Kelvin Knight (ed.),
The MacIntyre Reader (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) 267–275, pp. 273–274;
MacIntyre, A Partial Response to My Critics’, in John Horton and Susan Mendus
(eds), After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) 283–304, pp. 284–
286; MacIntyre, The Theses on Feuerbach: a Road Not Taken’ (1994), in The
MacIntyre Reader, 223–234, pp. 225–226, 231, hereafter TF; and MacIntyre, Poli-
tics, Philosophy, and the Common Good’ (1998), in The MacIntyre Reader, 235–252,
pp. 240–241, hereafter PP.
31 AV, p. 187.
32 It is important to note that practices’ are just one aspect of MacIntyre’s ethics,
the others being the narrative order of a single human life’ and the notion of a moral
tradition’ (AV, p. 187). Although I cannot explore narrative unity’ or tradition’
here, MacIntyre believes them integral parts of any coherent ethics.
33 AV, p. 188; PP, p. 240. See also MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
(London: Duckworth, 1988), p. 32, hereafter WJ, where he distinguishes between
goods of excellence’ (internal) and goods of eﬃciency’ (external).
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sustained engagement in the practice itself. Thus, the internal good
of carpentry inheres in both the excellence in performance’ of the
carpenter in producing her product and in the excellence of this
product itself.34 These are to be distinguished from the wealth,
fame, or power which may contingently accrue to her as a carpen-
ter on account of market conditions or the status enjoyed by her
occupation. Because they have no internal relation to speciﬁc prac-
tical activities, external goods can be gained without immersion in
a practice’s tradition or history, as the prevalence of cowboy’
tradespersons proves all too well. Moreover, whereas all members
of a practice and, by extension the wider community which prizes
that practice, beneﬁt from advancement in internal goods – whe-
ther it be long-distance running or innovative art forms – external
goods are largely zero-sum’ insofar as they are usually possessed
by distinct individuals or groups and not the community as a
whole.35
Third, as implied by the terms co-operative activity’ and goods
internal’, each practice is deﬁned by standards of excellence’ which
both determine the goal of the activity, its telos, and regulate its
internal functioning. That is, to be able to perform within a prac-
tice one must initially submit to the authority of the impersonal
standards which encapsulate the highest level of achievement
attained within that practice at a given point in time. Moreover,
not only does success in a practice require deference to established
standards; it also requires key qualities of character or virtues
which enable one to accept and recognize such standards as exem-
pliﬁed by others. Thus, a novice practitioner cannot advance within
her craft unless she possesses honesty in estimating her own abili-
ties; justice in according others recognition for their successes; and
courage in enduring the possibility of failure. An inability to culti-
vate these virtues renders the practice pointless except as a device
for achieving external goods’.36
34 AV, p. 189.
35 External goods are therefore characteristically objects of competition in which
there must be losers as well as winners. Internal goods are indeed the outcome of
competition to excel, but it is characteristic of them that their achievement is a good
for the whole community who participate in the practice’ (AV, pp. 190–191).
36 AV, p. 191.
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Finally, a practice requires not only individual virtue, but also
a supportive context. Hence MacIntyre’s distinction between
practices’ and institutions’. Whether they be craft guilds, laborato-
ries, universities, or hospitals, institutions are characteristically and
necessarily concerned with … external goods’.37 Since practices and
practitioners require money and other material resources, they sim-
ply cannot exist without institutional frameworks. However, this
institutional dependence leaves practices acutely vulnerable to cor-
ruption, to their internal goods – or teloi – being overwhelmed by
the vice of avarice (pleonexia).
It is precisely such institutional corruption, where internal goods
are subordinated to a desire for wealth or power, which deﬁnes
many modern productive activities. Reduced to the status of a job,
as in assembly lines or de-skilled service industries, work is now
separated from everything but the service of biological survival
and the reproduction of the labour force, on the one hand, and
that of institutionalized acquisitiveness, on the other’.38 Modern
workers work, therefore, not to create, excel, or achieve but simply
to consume, in line with the wider suppositions of our liberal emo-
tivist’ culture.39 The workplace has no connection with their wider
aspirations or goals, with who they are or who they wish to
become. Instead, it is a realm of existence that is to be contrasted
negatively with the realms of familial life and of leisure. Thus, there
comes about a compartmentalization of human existence in which
37 Ibid., p.194. See as well RPM, pp. 244–245; A Partial Response’, pp. 284–285,
289; Russell Keat, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market (Basingstoke:
Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 22–25; Kelvin Knight, Revolutionary Aristotelianism’,
in Iain Hampshire-Monk and James Stanyer (eds), Contemporary Political Studies
1996, Vol. III (Belfast, Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, 1996),
pp. 885–893; and Geoﬀ Moore and Ron Beadle, In Search of Organizational Virtue
in Business: Agents, Goods, Practices, Institutions and Environments’, Organization
Studies 27/3 (2006) 370–376.
38 Ibid., p. 227, but see as well AV, pp. 137, 253; RPM, p. 245; WJ, pp. 111–112;
MacIntyre, Marxism and Christianity, 2nd edn (London: Duckworth, 1995), p. x,
hereafterMC; PP, p. 249; and MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human
Beings Need the Virtues (London: Duckworth, 1999), pp. 113–116, hereafter DRA.
39 MacIntyre, Social Science Methodology as the Ideology of Bureaucratic
Authority’ (1979), in Knight (ed.), The MacIntyre Reader, 53–68, p. 55; MC, p. xiii.
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each sphere has its own role structure governed by its own speciﬁc
norms’.40 And in the workplace it is managerial norms, norms that
explicitly and consciously suppress the human potential of workers,
treating them not as ends-in-themselves but as manipulable objects,
that have assumed priority above all others.
Work as Intersubjective Self-Transformation
The preceding account already suggests the distinctiveness of
MacIntyre’s position. His concern is not primarily with worker
democracy, with altering occupational status, or with fairer distribu-
tions of the material resources accruing from production, although
he is acutely cognizant of the importance of these issues.41 Rather,
the focus of his theory of practices is the working process itself, that
is, the relationships entered, the capacities exercised, and the goals
achieved by individuals in their productive activities.42 In this
MacIntyre offers an understanding of the internal working process
that is superior not only to Habermas’s instrumentalized conception
but also to the early Marx’s concept of non-alienated labour. And
one key respect in which it is superior is in its re-conception of work
as essentially intersubjective, both in the sense of presuming
40 MacIntyre, Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency’, Philosophy
74 (1999) 311–329, p. 322. See also MacIntyre, Utilitarianism and the Presupposi-
tions of Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis’, in Kenneth Sayre (ed.), Values in the Electric Power
Industry (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 217–237, pp. 217–
237; WJ, pp. 337, 397; MC, pp. 132–133; PP, p. 236; Keith Breen, Alasdair
MacIntyre and the Hope for a Politics of Virtuous Acknowledged Dependence’,
Contemporary Political Theory 1/2 (2002) 181–201, pp. 182–183; and Keith Breen,
The State, Compartmentalization and the Turn to Local Community: A Critique of
the Political Thought of Alasdair MacIntyre’, The European Legacy 10/5 (2005) 485–
501, pp. 486–487.
41 See, for instance, (TF, p. 231; PP, p. 248) where MacIntyre argues for greater
worker self-determination; (AV, p. 159; A Partial Response’, pp. 289–290; DRA,
pp. 6–7) where he rejects Aristotle’s denigration of productive crafts and women’s
roles; and (MC, p. xxiii; DRA, pp. 121–130, 144), where he calls for distribution in
terms of both desert and human need.
42 As Richard Arneson (Meaningful Work and Market Socialism’, Ethics 97/3
(1987) 517–545, pp. 534–536) points out, concern with meaningful work is not
necessarily associated with worker democracy or with demands for altering status
hierarchies, since the latter are perfectly compatible with thoroughly instrumental-
ized, managerially controlled divisions of labour. Similar points are made by
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, pp. 444–445, and Murphy, The Moral
Economy of Labor, p. 232.
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trans-historical communities of practitioners and, as a consequence,
interpersonal modes of identity formation and transformation.
Although MacIntyre owes much to Marx’s ideal of non-alien-
ated labour, he differs from Marx on work in a number of ways.43
Most obviously, where Marx identiﬁes emancipatory praxis with
social labour’, MacIntyre endorses a pluralist understanding of
practical activity, ranging from farming and architecture to philos-
ophizing and government. He therefore avoids the charge of reduc-
ing such praxis to work, without, however, denying that productive
activity has an emancipatory referent, as Habermas unfortunately
does. This advance is augmented by MacIntyre’s more realistic
vision of non-alienated labour. Marx rejected all specialization or
division of labour as inherently oppressive. In its stead, he oﬀered
a highly romantic, expressivist vision of working life, where the
worker engages unhindered in any activity she wishes, the object of
her eﬀort being the realization of her own powers.44 From a
MacIntyrean viewpoint this ideal is to be faulted for neglecting the
fact that meaningful engagement by an individual in a speciﬁc
practice or practices precludes equal effort being devoted to alter-
native practices, since such engagement necessarily draws on lim-
ited resources.45 Thus, specialization and division of labour are
inevitable, although certainly not specialization in the Taylorist,
43 On MacIntyre’s indebtedness to the early Marx on labour, which is explained
by their shared Aristotelianism, see TF, p. 225; Keat, Cultural Goods and the Limits
of the Market, pp. 5, 29; and Peter McMylor, Alasdair MacIntyre: Critic of
Modernity (London, New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 46–73.
44 A key statement of this utopian vision appears in The German Ideology: in
communist society … each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes,
society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one
thing today and another thing tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, ﬁsh in the after-
noon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, without
ever becoming hunter, ﬁsherman, shepherd, or critic’ (Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 47,
my emphasis).
45 Practices will often be contingently incompatible and … make rival claims
upon our allegiance’ because human beings are necessarily ﬁnite beings enjoying
neither boundless time nor ability (AV, p. 197). For similar criticisms of Marx’s
rejection of the division of labour, which depends upon a mistaken conﬂation of
specialization with forced, de-humanizing specialization, see Jon Elster, Self-Reali-
zation in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life’, Social
Philosophy & Policy 3/2 (1986) 97–126, p. 101, and Murphy, The Moral Economy of
Labor, pp. 17–23, 217.
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managerial sense. More fundamentally, it is also to be faulted for
insuﬃcient attention to the social or communal basis of all prac-
tical endeavour, the fact that work presumes dependence on others
and on distinct socio-historical traditions.
It is, of course, true that Marx’s notion of non-alienated labour
suggests an irreducible intersubjectivity in stressing the overcoming
of workers’ alienation from other men’. However, what such over-
coming would involve, what it would mean to be in constructive
social relation with others, is left largely unexplored. Indeed, as
MacIntyre sees it, Marxism was from the outset’ characterized by
a certain radical individualism’ that is unable to properly explain
how genuinely liberating modes of practical endeavour come into
being.46 Comprehending how such endeavours are formed means
comprehending the truth that we are never more (and sometimes
less) than the co-authors of our own narratives’, in other words,
that the narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of
narratives’.47 Even if alone, when we engage in productive work we
are implicitly participating in a community of past and present
workers. This truth reveals key moral-ethical aspects of working
life underthematized by Marx and completely neglected within
Habermasian theory. Most signiﬁcant is that meaningful work –
work which is not simply the repetitive execution of discrete tasks –
requires learning, requires the individual to apprentice herself to a
speciﬁc profession and to accept, as already explained, its authori-
tative standards of excellence.48 Learning entails, in turn, the fun-
damentally ethical relationship of pupil and teacher.49 And while
initially characterized by inequality, this relationship is nonetheless
reciprocal, pupils according respect to their teachers on account of
46 AV, p. 261. See also RPM, pp. 246–247; TF, pp. 232–234; MC: p. xxxi; and
Keat, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, p. 5. This individualist element in
Marxism explains why it never could arrive at a true alternative to liberal morality,
when it concerned itself with morality at all, but always ended up endorsing some
form of utilitarianism (Kautsky, Trotsky) or Kantian deontology (Bernstein,
Guevara).
47 AV, pp. 213, 218.
48 It belongs to the concept of a practice… that its goods can only be achieved by
subordinating ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other practitioners’
(Ibid., pp. 191, 258; WJ, p. 31).
49 As made clear by Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judge-
ment and the Lure of Technique (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1993), p. 370.
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superior experience, teachers, diﬀerently, exhibiting care and regard
for their pupils.
Habermas fails to grasp this educative dimension of work because
his ideal of communicative action presumes subjects who are episte-
mically and experientially the same, that is, who possess equal
authority. Any activity which presumes unequal authority is therefore
sidelined, a result which is compounded by his identiﬁcation of work
with the domination of nature. Yet, far from being dominative, the
relationship between apprentice and master craftsperson is, when
properly ordered, fundamentally enabling and transformative.50 The
intrinsic goal of productive crafts … is never only to catch ﬁsh, or
produce beef or milk’ but also to do so in a manner consonant with
the excellences of the craft, so that there is not only a good product,
but the craftsperson is perfected through and in her or his activity’.51
This understanding of work as a mode of human striving and perfec-
tion presupposes a distinctly Aristotelian understanding of human
nature and development. In contrast to liberal ethical theory, which
in its utilitarian and neutralist forms privileges individuals’ given
wants and desires, Aristotelianism presumes a gap between man-as-
he-happens-to-be’ and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-
nature’.52 Under this view the function of ethical reﬂection and co-
operative activity is, therefore, not to reinforce who we currently are
but to facilitate human ﬂourishing, eudaimonia, that is, the selves that
we could become if we realized our potentialities. Engaging in a prac-
tice, then, the apprentice does not simply satisfy her existing prefer-
ences and desires; rather, she extends her innate capacities and
powers and this, MacIntyre suggests, in three decisive ways.
The ﬁrst, as already intimated, relates to the character of the
practitioner – and to the fact that to succeed in a practice she
must cultivate the virtues of honesty, justice, and courage, amongst
others. Basic to this transformation of character is a transforma-
tion of desire, of the will.53 Thus, if all goes well, novice workers
50 On the authority relation involved here, see John O’Neill, Ecology, Policy and
Politics: Human Well-Being and the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993),
pp. 126–131.
51 MacIntyre, A Partial Response’, p. 284; WJ, p. 31.
52 AV, pp. 52–53.
53 Individuals make the good of a practice their own only by allowing their
participation in the activity to effect a transformation in the desires which they
initially brought with them to the activity’ (TF, pp. 225–226).
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will gradually realize that what they had initially desired (money,
status, a job) when entering, for example, the practice of carpentry
is not what they, qua carpenters, should truly aim at – which is, of
course, being the best carpenters possible. Necessitating discipline
and patience, such transformation does not, however, entail an
unrealistic altruism or a denial of one’s inclinations. As MacIntyre
notes, the goods internal to a practice are indeed the outcome of
competition to excel ’, to prove oneself the best.54 Moreover, when
practitioners have cultivated themselves to appreciate the excel-
lences of a particular practice, they characteristically’ enjoy their
achievement and activity in achieving’.55 That is, a speciﬁc form of
pleasure supervenes’ upon successful performance of their roles as
carpenter, engineer, etc. However, while engagement in meaningful
work is not to be equated with self-sacriﬁce, it is to be sharply dif-
ferentiated from the ruthless pursuit of money or power and the
pleasures which these external goods bring, since the latter do not
necessitate and are infrequently inimical to the entrance into and
maintenance of practices.
The second manner in which the apprentice is transformed
relates to her innate capacities and powers. The goal of learning
and of teaching is not simply to transmit knowledge from one gen-
eration to the next, but also to enable the apprentice to herself
become a master practitioner. Such mastery implies having the
knowledge, skills, experience, sensitivities, and clarity of judgement
necessary to execute complex tasks in moments of novelty and
uncertainty. Meaningful work is therefore work which contributes
positively to the development of worker maturity, freedom. This
freedom or autonomy is not born of freedom from others, the
mistaken view MacIntyre attributes to Nietzsche, Sartre and much
liberal thinking.56 Instead, such freedom is born of networks of
interdependence that facilitate the transition from initial passive
acceptance of received patterns of thought and action to active
independent practical reasoning.57 The pinnacle of maturity in
productive practices comes when the worker can question in an
54 AV, p. 190, my emphasis.
55 Ibid., p. 197. See also Elster, Self-Realization in Work and Politics’, p. 100.
56 Ibid., pp. 35, 205, 221.
57 DRA, pp. 71–76. For similar defences of the autonomy securing aspect of
meaningful work, see Elster, Self-Realization in Work and Politics’, and Adina
Schwartz, Meaningful Work’, Ethics 92/4 (1982) 634–646.
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informed, knowledgeable manner what had heretofore been acc-
epted as the best or most excellent within her practice. The greatest
achievements in each area at each stage’, MacIntyre asserts, always
exhibit a freedom to violate present established maxims’.58 Such
achievement is often fraught with difﬁculty and conﬂict; indeed, it
is sometimes only through conﬂict that we learn what our ends
and purposes are’.59 Nonetheless, it is in the nature of meaningful
work to enable us to constructively question the past. And, in line
with MacIntyre’s critique of compartmentalization, if we lack such
freedom in our working lives, we are also likely to lack it in leisure
time, in familial life, and in politics.60
Excellence in work relies on a dialectic of acceptance and cri-
tique, of honest recognition of the achievements of past workers
and yet the desire to better and transcend these successes. There is,
nonetheless, a third way in which meaningful work is transforma-
tive. Becoming proﬁcient in a practice, workers do not only alter
their character or attain greater maturity. They also discover with-
in the pursuit of excellence … the good of a certain kind of life’, a
good which cannot be attained in any other activity.61 Thus, the
sculptor discovers those goods unique to the role and life of the
sculptor, just as do carpenters, miners, or builders when they
engage in their work. The importance of this goes far beyond
working activity itself insofar as the goods unique to working life
complement and add to goods associated with other roles typically
occupied by individuals, whether that of citizen, parent, or, indeed,
consumer. Moreover, in engendering goods unique to their prac-
tice, goods both internal to the performance of their activity (initia-
tive, dexterity, right judgement, etc) and the products which issue
from it (artworks, buildings, quality produce), workers contribute
58 WJ, p. 31.
59 AV, p. 164.
60 This is supported by empirical studies (for instance, Melvin Kohn and Carmi
Schooler, The Reciprocal Effects of the Substantive Complexity of Work and
Intellectual Flexibility: A Longitudinal Study’, American Journal of Sociology 84
(1978) 24–52, and Arthur Kornhuaser, Mental Health of the Industrial Worker: A
Detroit Study (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964)) which stress the intercon-
nections between meaningful work and individuals’ cognitive development, ambi-
tion, initiative, and mental health. On these ﬁndings, see Schwartz, Meaningful
Work’, pp. 636–639.
61 AV, p. 190, my emphasis.
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to the manifold possibilities of human life and experience.62 That
is, they exemplify, qua workers, a key aspect of what it means to be
human, therefore adding something of enduring universal worth’
to our fundamental condition.63
MacIntyre’s Non-Dualist Social Theory
From the above, it is clear that in proposing an intersubjective the-
ory of practice MacIntyre helps retrieve work as a phenomenon
possessing intrinsic moral-ethical signiﬁcance. It should also be
clear that his project is essentially emancipatory, contra those who
accuse him of conservative conventionalism.64 The key criteria of
meaningful work are not passivity or deference to tradition as an
end-in-itself, but learning, striving, and increasing mastery. And
although he insists on particularity’, on our being located in spe-
ciﬁc socio-historical traditions, MacIntyre is nonetheless adamant
that it is in moving forward from such particularity that the search
for the good, for the universal, consists’.65 When in good order,
work exempliﬁes this urge towards the good life as such.
However, we saw earlier that Habermas’s denigration of work
stemmed not simply from his elimination of its internal ethical
import, but also from the structure of his wider social theory.
Dividing social action into the categories of communicative and
instrumental/strategic action, Habermas splits social reality into
62 As Keat (Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, p. 48) points out, in
increasing the substantive possibilities of the human good’ meaningful work enriches
human life and therefore gives greater scope to autonomy, our ability to choose from
a range of conceptions of the good.
63 TF, p. 225.
64 See, for instance, the criticisms forwarded by Amy Gutmann, Communitarian
Critics of Liberalism’, in Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit (eds), Communitari-
anism and Individualism (Oxford: OUP, 1992), 120–136, pp. 131–133; Elizabeth
Frazer and Nicola Lacey, MacIntyre, Feminism, and the Concept of a Practice’, in
Horton and Mendus (eds), After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of
Alasdair MacIntyre, 265–282, p. 275; Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberal-
ism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 93; and Martha Nuss-
baum, Recoiling from Reason’, New York Review of Books 19 (1989) 36–41. On
MacIntyre’s distance from conservatism, see Kelvin Knight, Aristotelianism versus
Communitarianism’, Analyse & Kritik 27 (2005) 259–273.
65 AV, p. 221; MacIntyre, Moral Rationality, Tradition, and Aristotle: a Reply to
Onora O’Neill, Raimond Gaita, and Stephen R.L. Clark’, Inquiry 26 (1983) 447–466,
pp. 462–463.
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two, with lifeworld’ corresponding to the communicative realms of
family and civil society, and system’ corresponding to the norm-
free sociality’ deﬁnitive of the administrative state and capitalist
market. The result is that productive activity is surrendered to and
deemed the proper preserve of technocracy. Here I want to show
how a MacIntyrean conception of practice escapes this quietist
dualist vision.
One crucial way in which MacIntyre breaks with Habermasian
social dualism is already apparent. Where Habermas reduces work
to efﬁcient productivity, to the external ends it serves, MacIntyre
stresses the internal dimensions of working life without, however,
denying the importance of productivity or external goods. Some
commentators, particularly David Miller, have accused MacIntyre
of focusing on self-contained practices’ such as chess and sport,
whose goals are internal to the practices themselves (excellent crick-
eteering, let’s say), to the neglect of purposive practices’ such as
building, farming, or medicine, whose goal lies outside the perfor-
mance of the practice, that is, lies in the products produced, whe-
ther houses, food, or public health.66 Miller’s point is that these
purposive activities’ are far more signiﬁcant socially than self-con-
tained practices’ and that the criteria for evaluating them are not
internal to the practice itself but lie outside in the broader social
ends’ that the practice serves. Thus, MacIntyre’s emphasis on inter-
nal goods, while not entirely wrong, is nonetheless mistaken. Yet
this criticism is a serious misreading of MacIntyre’s position. As
regards productive work, MacIntyre is quite clear that the good
internal to such work consists simultaneously in the excellence of
the worker’s performance and in the excellence of the product.67 It
is simply false, therefore, to claim that he is unconcerned with pro-
ductivity or with the use-value that inheres in products. Moreover,
66 David Miller, Virtues, Practices and Justice’, in Horton and Mendus (eds),
After MacIntyre, 245–264, p. 254.
67 Using the example of portrait painting, MacIntyre (AV, p. 189, my emphasis)
insists that its internal good consists ﬁrst of all’ in the excellence of the products,
both the excellence in performance by the painters and that of each portrait itself’. It
is worth noting, too, that he rejects Miller’s accusation that he ignores the wider
social goals associated with practices. Indeed, as MacIntyre (AV, p. 275; RPM, pp.
242–245; A Partial Response’, p. 284; Social Structures and their Threats to Moral
Agency’, pp. 315–321) understands it, a full account of human ﬂourishing requires
practices to be situated in terms of their contribution to individual narratives/lives
and the wider well-being of particular communities and historical traditions.
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MacIntyre in no way denies the importance of external goods,
either in the form of particular products, of money, of power, or of
status. These external goods genuinely are goods … [and] no one
can despise them altogether without a certain hypocrisy’.68 The
point of his introducing the internal-external good distinction is
not, then, to privilege internal ends over external ends or to under-
play purposive activity, but instead to contrast those forms of work
in which working life is lived solely for the money or power which
accrue to it with those in which working life is both materially
rewarding and intrinsically meaningful. Thus, the question of eco-
nomic productivity and the question of the moral-ethical status of
our everyday lives are not dirempted, as when Habermas separates
communicative from instrumental reason, lifeworld from system,
but woven together into a complex whole.
A more fundamental challenge to Habermasian dualism issues
from MacIntyre’s critique of managerial authority and the ideology
of technique associated with that authority. Habermas has long
feared technicism and he arrived at his communicative versus
instrumental reason division precisely to counter it. Yet while this
division rules out the instrumentalization of lifeworld activities, we
saw that it legitimates the instrumentalization of system, of the
economy and large-scale organization in general. By contrast,
MacIntyre contests managerialism as a whole. In doing so he
undermines Habermas’s distinction between communicative and
instrumental action by incorporating technique and skill under a
broader conception of praxis that is the prerogative of ordinary
practitioners, not bureaucratic elites.
MacIntyre’s critique of managerial authority centres on two
arguments. The ﬁrst disputes the value neutrality of effectiveness’,
the term which usually underpins justiﬁcations of managerial
authority. In short, effectiveness’ is not neutral but a moral ideal
supported by a speciﬁc worldview in which human beings are
essentially consuming beings. This worldview is contested by the
Aristotelian assumption that what is essentially human is rational
activity’, consumption existing merely to serve this activity as it
manifests itself in work, leisure, and everyday interaction.69 Thus,
managerialism is not at all neutral, above the thrust and cut of
68 AV, p. 196, my emphasis.
69 MacIntyre, Social Science Methodology’, p. 55.
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axiological debate, but is itself a controversial ethical standpoint.
To this MacIntyre adds an argument against the possibility of
managerial expertise, typically conceived. As he sees it, managerial
expertise presumes the possibility of predicting future behaviour
according to law-like generalizations. However, such prediction is
rendered impossible by the inherent unpredictability and contin-
gency of human life.70 The social world is deﬁned by complex mul-
ti-factorial action situations where observers must take numerous
agents and their roles into account (including their own role as
observer), thus frustrating all attempts to arriving at a uniquely
deﬁnitive line of causality. Moreover, there is the related difﬁculty
of deﬁning or interpreting what a particular action context is, whe-
ther, for example, a factory stoppage is primarily due to a conﬂict
of employer and worker interests or whether union, party, or gov-
ernmental interests also play a crucial role.71 Given this, the future
is necessarily unknown and unknowable.
The basis of Frederick Taylor’s and his successors’ claim to
manipulative competence, which characteristically legitimates their
authority over workers, is therefore a moral ﬁction … a theatre of
illusions’.72 If technicism succeeds it does so only on account of
our having been hoodwinked into accepting it as natural, normal.
Yet although MacIntyre spurns technicism, his theory of practices
does not downplay the importance of technique and skilfulness or
distance these categorically from relations of intersubjectivity. In-
deed, to do so would be to repeat the theoretical errors that led
Habermas to devalue productive practices. Instead, his view is that
practices are intersubjective activities whose meaning goes beyond
skilfulness to incorporate the realization of speciﬁc ends, yet this
realization is impossible without the employment of skills. What is
distinctive in a practice’, MacIntyre claims, is the way in which
conceptions of the relevant goods and ends which technical skills
serve – and every practice does require the exercise of technical
skills – are transformed and enriched’.73 Thus, skills or technai con-
stitute the subordinate but nonetheless integral means to achieving
70 AV, pp. 88–108.
71 For further elements of this critique, see MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of
the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1971), pp. 211–
229, 260–279.
72 AV, pp. 76–77, 106–107.
73 Ibid., p. 193, my emphasis; TF, p. 226.
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internal and external goods. Inserting technical skills as constitutive
elements within an inclusively conceived praxis, MacIntyre thereby
eﬀects an analytic melding of the value-rational and instrumental-
rational which prevents the identiﬁcation of action either with mere
instrumentality or pure communication. He accomplishes this, how-
ever, without relinquishing the distinction between manipulative
and non-manipulative activity. All worthwhile goods are attained
in company with or through reliance on others and this necessary
relatedness takes two rudimentary forms, a virtuous relatedness
where others are treated with regard or a vicious relatedness where
they suﬀer debasement into objects.
The effects of incorporating technique within the concept of
practice are deeply salutary. Most obviously, it reveals that there is
a key distinction to be made between a crude instrumentalism cor-
responding to the Weberian ideal-type of Zweckrationalita¨t and an
instrumentality or purposiveness’ that is but one part of broader
reﬂective practice. This latter notion of instrumentality, which
bridges the divide between poiesis and praxis, breaks the inferential
chain that leads Habermas to identify purposiveness with manipu-
lative technique, manipulative technique with production, and
thereby production or work with the domination of nature and of
ourselves. Furthermore, viewing technique as just one part of
human action, and of the practical wisdom (phronesis) which guides
it, fatally undermines the justiﬁcation for technocratic elites.74 That
justiﬁcation rests on the assumption that there is an epistemically
determined separation of conception from execution: managers
plan and workers execute’.75 Under this view, managers lead and
workers follow because managers possess a scientiﬁc body of
knowledge and methods that is superior to ordinary wisdom. But if
the knowledge claimed by managers is impossible and their compe-
tence merely a charade of competence, then the rationale for the
separation of conception and execution disappears, since all that
remains is the competence of ordinary practitioners. As MacIntyre
sees it, this competence or wisdom is acquired not primarily and
74 Here I rely on Dunne’s (Back to the Rough Ground, p. 365) argument that
phronesis and techne are intimately related, that it was Aristotle’s explicit statement
that practical intellect (phronesis) governs (archei) productive intellect. And phro-
nesis not only supervened on techne ab extra ... but also could be an intrinsic element
in the exercise of the techne itself’.
75 Murphy, The Moral Economy of Labor, p. 82.
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never only by theoretical reﬂection, but in everyday shared activities
and the evaluations of alternatives that those activities impose’.76
Moreover, it is a competence that can never be possessed by a well-
deﬁned elite sealed off from the mass, but is instead the varying
possession of many practitioners who abide by shared standards of
excellence. Although there will be always excellent, good, mediocre,
and poor carpenters or engineers, the practices of carpentry and
engineering are open to all, should they pursue it. And while
authoritative practitioners are in many ways exemplars, their exper-
tise is always vulnerable to critical evaluations from those being
educated into a practice.77
However, the most profound effect of incorporating technique
within practice is the suggestion that the manner in which we orga-
nize productive activities is underdetermined – open to change and
revision. The economic base of a society is not its tools’, MacIntyre
once wrote, but the people co-operating using these particular tools
in the manner necessary to their use’.78 Thus, it is not technology
which determines the economy, but rather the interface of human
beings with their technology. This interface suggests that the prac-
tical, our ability to evaluate ends, and the technical, the means we
use in arriving at our ends, necessarily overlap. That is, the manner
in which we conceive of our ends depends on how we understand
our means, and our understanding of our means depends, similarly,
on what we consider our ends to be. This co-generative overlap
suggests, in turn, that hierarchical, fragmented, and rigidly con-
trolled divisions of labour where workers are condemned to the
repetition of simple itemized tasks are not dictated by technological
or economic necessity per se, but are also the result of particular
understandings of human relationships and particular evaluative
ideals. As Murphy puts it, eﬃciency’ does require work to be
analysed into its fundamental elements’, but it does not entail that
workers must be restricted to the performance of a few such ele-
ments’.79 Indeed, production may be conducted in terms of assem-
bly line principles where isolated and separated workers possess a
76 DRA, p. 136.
77 Thus, no one at any stage can ever rule out the possibility of their present
beliefs and judgements being shown to be inadequate’ (WJ, p. 361).
78 MacIntyre, Notes from the Moral Wilderness’ (1958), in Knight (ed.), The
MacIntyre Reader, 31–52, p. 39, my emphasis.
79 Murphy, The Moral Economy of Labor, p. 23.
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limited number of skills, or it may, instead, be conducted on the
basis of workers with numerous skills and extensive expertise. The
key difference between the two is not the level of productivity
attained, since there are differing ways to ensure the same efﬁcient
output, but the disparity in power and control enjoyed respectively
by workers and their managers.80
There are, in other words, better and worse ways of institutional-
izing our productive activities. Thus Knight’s claim that MacIntyre’s
distinction between practices and institutions recalls Habermas’s
dichotomy between lifeworld and system rests upon a elementary
misunderstanding.81 Simply put, if stark oppositions between the
practical and technical cannot be sustained, if productive activities
simultaneously concern ideal and material interests, and if, as well,
there can be no practice which is not institutionalized, then there is
no possibility of an ontologically spatialized reality. MacIntyre
does not think practices and institutions opposed; rather, his core
argument is that particular institutional forms guided by speciﬁc
conceptions of human nature and rationality lead to the corruption
of practices.82 These forms and conceptions were abetted by chan-
ges in ethical self-understandings from Aristotle, through Aquinas,
to Hume, Kant to Nietzsche, and thereafter to contemporary
emotivist’ liberalism. Reducing individuals to rational egoists and
consumers, the institution of the capitalist market adheres to con-
ceptions of humanity and consequent practical teloi that undermine
institutions directed towards human ﬂourishing. It is not systemic
de-linguistiﬁcation’, as suggested by Habermas’s metaphor of
uncoupling’, but perverse ethical understandings and misapprehen-
sions of institutional ends which alienate human beings from their
essential powers.
80 Murphy (ibid., p. 31) correctly points to how different job designs’ achieve
similar levels of productivity: where Ford introduced the assembly line to restrict
each worker to a single task… Volvo introduced the assembly island to enable teams
of workers to assemble entire vehicles’. This example clearly shows that there is
freedom in the way technology synthesizes a group of tasks and … in the way
technology translates tasks into jobs’.
81 Knight, The MacIntyre Reader, p. 293.
82 As MacIntyre (The Privatization of Good: An Inaugural Lecture’, The Review
of Politics 52/2 (1990) 344–361, p. 360) puts it, debate and conﬂict as to the best
forms of practices have to be debate and conﬂict between rival institutions and not
merely between rival theories’.
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The focus of MacIntyre’s thought is therefore on clashing insti-
tutional orders and their discrepant practical rationalities, rather
than opposed spheres or realms. In this it recalls the arguments of
Booth and Durkheim as regards the evaluative underpinnings of
modern capitalism, and their claim that it necessitates and requires
normative ideals that permeate all of society. But while capitalism
provides systematic incentives to develop a type of character’,
MacIntyre insists, in strong contrast to Booth and others, that this
character or personality type is one deﬁned by a propensity to
injustice’.83 This condemnation of capitalism as embodying an
impoverished moral-ethical vision, coupled with a refusal to theo-
retically dichotomize reality, lends MacIntyre’s thought a critical
impetus entirely lacking in Habermas. To the degree that all insti-
tutions, no matter how malformed, are guided by ethical ideals,
there cannot be a realm of latent functionalism’ or norm-free soci-
ality’. The thought that as regards the economy and production we
are under the thrall of an invisible and near all-powerful second
nature’ is therefore dismissed as a species of liberalism’s ideological
divorce’ of man’s political status from his economic status’.84 The
task at hand, then, is not to push back colonization’ of lifeworld
by system, all the while respecting the dirempted logics of these
opposed arenas, but to recognize and to recover system as
intimately part of our lifeworld.
CONCLUSION
The making and sustaining of forms of human community – and
therefore of institutions – itself has all the characteristics of a
practice’, and one, moreover, which is just as applicable to our
productive lives as to our lives as citizens, family members, or
consumers.85 This realization that the way in which we institution-
alize our productive activities is more than a technical issue, but
also an ethical and political concern, is what fundamentally sepa-
rates Habermas from MacIntyre. It is also what renders MacIntyre’s
thought a key resource in recovering an emancipatory conception
of work. Such a recovery necessitates signiﬁcant revision of our
83 MC, p. xiv (my emphasis).
84 Ibid., p. 133.
85 AV, p. 194.
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dominant understandings of the economy and of politics. Against
accumulation for its own sake or for the sake of possession’, a
dominant prejudice of our society, we must realize that possession
of things or of money as a resource to acquire things is warranted
only insofar as it contributes to activity which has goods internal
to itself of the appropriate kind’.86 That activity, of course, consists
in the ﬁnal analysis in the realization of the good life, not the per-
petuation of mere life. Similarly, politics can no longer be seen as
the accumulation of power, the defence of private interest, or the
execution of bureaucratically determined policy. Instead, an Aristo-
telian politics sets itself the threefold task of nurturing the condi-
tions of human ﬂourishing, facilitating those diverse practices in
which ﬂourishing manifests itself, and advancing communal ideals
through reﬂective critique. So conceived, politics is an activity
through which other types of practice are ordered so that individu-
als may direct themselves towards what is best for them and their
community’.87
I have argued that MacIntyre’s approach surpasses Haberm-
asian critical theory in furnishing us with an intersubjective concep-
tion of work and in avoiding the pitfalls of social dualism. By way
of conclusion, however, it is necessary brieﬂy to register partial
doubt regarding MacIntyre’s position. This doubt stems from Mac-
Intyre’s thorough-going anti-modernism and his adherence to Karl
Polanyi’s disembedding’ thesis.88 MacIntyre dismisses modernity
and its central institutions, the state and capitalist market, as irre-
deemably inimical to practice-like endeavour. In modernity political
and economic life is a civil war carried on by other means’ where
factional will-to-power has triumphed over the common good.89
This is due to basic changes in our conception of ourselves and the
rise of the modern state, but also to the disembedding’ of the
economy in the early modern period, which, as diagnosed by Pola-
nyi, gave rise to modern capitalism. From Homeric Greece to the
Medieval period, production had occurred within the household
86 RPM, p. 245.
87 PP, p. 241.
88 On his indebtedness to Polanyi, see MacIntyre, After Virtue and Marxism: A
Response to Wartofsky’, Inquiry 27/2 (1984) 251–254, pp. 253–254; AV, pp. 239–240;
WJ, p. 211; Keat, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, p. 111; and McMylor,
Alasdair MacIntyre, pp. 97–103.
89 AV, p. 253.
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and was therefore rooted within and incomprehensible without ref-
erence to the social relationships, expectations, and wider forms of
community which the household … sustains’.90 The pursuit of
wealth, power, and status was consequently kept in check by a
complete institutional nexus or social whole’ which presupposed
the existence of a common good upheld by shared virtues of char-
acter. However, this institutional nexus was torn asunder with the
birth of the modern market and non-household based production.
A sphere of life now radically separate from that of family or poli-
tics, the modern market economy assumed the form of a self-regu-
lating’ domain recognizing no social roles or values except the
imperatives of proﬁt-making and consumption.91 The effect, Mac-
Intyre claims, was to expel practices to the margins of social and
cultural life’, to those largely self-sufﬁcient small-scale local com-
munities in which the activities of families, workplaces, schools,
clinics, clubs dedicated to debate and clubs dedicated to games and
sports, and religious congregations … all ﬁnd a place’.92 The ex-
emplars of meaningful working life are not the modern ﬁrm and
factory, but Donegal farming co-operatives, Mayan communities in
Guatemala and Mexico, Welsh mining communities, and New
England ﬁshing villages.
There are two key problems with this narrative. The ﬁrst is the
theoretical incoherence engendered by MacIntyre’s recourse to the
disembedding’ thesis. I argued in the previous section that MacIn-
tyre is to be praised for avoiding social dualism and stressing the
ethical character of all social forms, even impoverished forms such
as modern capitalism and bureaucracy. Every action is the bearer
and expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts’
and every piece of theorizing and every expression of belief is a
political and moral action’.93 Thus, the manager and stockbroker
are moral characters expressing speciﬁc ethical ideals, no less than
the characters of citizen or of craftsperson. The problem with the
disembedding’ thesis, however, is that it is virtually identical to
90 Ibid., p. 227. See also Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and
Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 46.
91 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, pp. 41, 71.
92 AV, p. 227; DRA, pp. 135, 143.
93 AV, p. 61.
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Habermas’s uncoupling’ thesis.94 Both presume that there was a
radical historical break between pre-modernity and modernity; both
presume that this break consisted in the appearance of a self-regu-
lating’ or norm-free’ economic sphere; and both, ﬁnally, divide
reality into different spheres – one realm where ethical relations are
at home, and another purged of all imperatives except that of prof-
it. MacIntyre’s acceptance of Polanyi’s thesis threatens, therefore,
to return him to the problematic binaries and spatializations which
his thought otherwise contests, since it is impossible to consistently
accept this thesis and to reject social dualism.95
The second problem is MacIntyre’s sweeping dismissal of the
major institutional settings of modern life: his stress that it is only
in the periphery of modern society, in those towns and villages
which retain the integrated character of pre-modern communities,
that practice-like endeavour can be maintained. This dismissal is
suspect for a number of reasons, not least MacIntyre’s rather
superﬁcial assessment of the hierarchies and exclusions which
deﬁned pre-modern communities; the unsubstantiated and nostalgic
assumption that the productive activities of pre-modern workers
were predominantly practice-like; the implausible and reductive
conjecture that capitalism takes but one form; and his failure to
recognize the structural interpenetration of local communities and
trans-communal institutions, whether national or supra-national.
However, by far the most problematic implication of this dismissal
is the supposition that those institutions – ﬁrms, businesses, facto-
ries, service industries, private and public bureaucracies – within
which the vast majority of contemporary workers spend their pro-
ductive lives are incapable of internal transformation.
Of course, MacIntyre is right to think that such institutions are
subject to increasing managerial control. He is also right to
question the present likelihood of radical, large-scale alterations in
the structures of existing capitalism. But he errs in excluding the
94 See, for instance, Habermas’s argument, following Polanyi, that in the non-
monetarized economic activities of archaic societies, the mechanism of exchange has
so little detached itself from normative contexts that a clear separation between
economic and noneconomic values is hardly possible’ (TCA, II, p. 163).
95 Note that one can reject the disembedding’ thesis whilst nonetheless endorsing
MacIntyre’s claims about compartmentalization’. Compartmentalization’ entails
that there are separate spheres of life governed by different norms and ideals. Dis-
embedding’, by contrast, entails that there is one sphere of life, the economic, which
is distinct from others in being norm-free.
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possibility of reform, of lessening the deformations perpetuated by
the current economic order. His mistake here is to assume all mod-
ern institutions are necessarily doomed to take a Taylorist form.96
This assumption neglects the political contingency of Taylorism’s
success, its status as an ideology which need not have gained domi-
nance and which stands vulnerable to subversion, as suggested by
MacIntyre’s own critique of managerial authority. Indeed, the
activities housed within modern institutions – whether nursing,
education, manufacturing, retailing, or even management itself –
remain subject to ﬁerce internal contests that recurrently problema-
tize the everyday arrangement and wider social meaning of our
working lives. Yet it is precisely these real, if indeterminate and
precarious, opportunities for resistance, for rendering modern work
more practice-like, that are occluded by MacIntyre’s totalizing
repudiation of modern life. Thus, while his theory of practice
eschews ontological spatialization, a profound disillusionment
with the present premised upon an idealized vision of pre-moder-
nity tempts him into a position structurally analogous to that of
Habermas. Practitioners’ productive powers may no longer fall
under the sign of latent functionality, but those citizen competen-
cies or worker capacities interwoven with the modern state and
economy unfortunately do, meaning that large areas of human
endeavour are once again distanced from critique.
If we are to constructively employ MacIntyre’s theory of prac-
tice to lessen the excision of meaning and purpose from our work-
ing lives, it has to be on the basis of modern social forms and
institutions, not peripheral communities. Indeed, it is because he
fails to acknowledge this that MacIntyre’s thought tends toward
paradox. MacIntyre commits himself to the Aristotelian assertion
that the life of virtue within the community of the polis is available
only to those who already participate more or less fully in that
life’.97 That is, only through inculcation within pre-existing authori-
tative standards do the young learn what it is to be proﬁcient
reﬂective practitioners and thereafter take over these standards to
maintain, augment, or reject them. The good is already but imperfectly
96 An assumption implied in his claim that in modern culture we know of no
organized movement towards power that is not bureaucratic and managerial in mode
and we know of no justiﬁcations for authority which are not Weberian [and techn-
icist] in form’ (AV: 109, my emphasis).
97 WJ, p. 110.
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in the world, not hidden from view in some speculative realm of
Platonic Ideas and known only to a few.98 Yet modernity is also
said to exclude practices and the common goods embodied within
them. Those born within the social structures of modernity lack
the educative and institutional pre-requisites to advance or even to
identify their own and their common good. The unavoidable impli-
cation is that for actors not belonging to marginalized pre-modern
communities there exists little possibility of practical learning and,
by inference, of critiquing received standards. But if this is so, then
MacIntyre is caught in a dilemma, for contemporary actors, the
plain persons’ of whom he constantly speaks, cannot be simulta-
neously capable and incapable of perceiving a temporally located
good. He must either hold to Aristotle’s claim that the good exists
and admit that modernity is receptive, however imperfectly, to
practices and their educative structures or hold to his totalizing
critique and reject Aristotle in favour of some latter-day Platonism.








98 See Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground, p.380, and Herbert Schna¨delbach, What
is Neo-Aristotelianism?’, Praxis International 7 (1987): 225–237, pp. 226–233.
Indeed, MacIntyre (AV, p. 147;WJ, pp. 90–93) himself praises Aristotle’s defence of
ordinary citizens against Plato’s Philosopher-King and pessimism about the social
world’. However, he fails to perceive his own slip into a form of Platonism in
separating the many who spend their lives in modern social forms from the minority
who comprise pre-modern communities.
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